

Minor archives, meta histories GLASS Faculty Roundtable

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On 16 October 2015 in Leiden University

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Ethan Mark (LIAS - Japan Studies, Leiden)

Panellists

Dipesh Chakrabarty (History, Chicago)

Nira Wickramasinghe (LIAS - Modern South Asia, Leiden)

Ksenia Robbe (LUCAS - Literary Studies, Leiden)

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Dipesh Chakrabarty (DC): The problem of minor histories or 'subaltern pasts' came to me and my colleagues in subaltern studies because, as we explored the role of Indian peasants in nationalist mobilisation, it became very clear that someone like [Mahatma] Gandhi was understood by peasants through rumours that circulated about him. All those circulated rumours, which one of my colleagues studied, clearly showed that people were ascribing to Gandhi the sort of powers that they would ascribe to local gods and goddesses. In the Hindu hierarchy there are gods with all India jurisdictions and all-subject jurisdictions, and they can basically decide your fate on anything. Then, there are specialised minor gods – somebody who is in charge of cholera, some-

body who is in charge of smallpox – and Gandhi was given the power of minor gods in these rumours. He was assimilated to some understanding of powers of intervention that local gods and goddesses had. It became clear that in writing history, a peasant's narration of his or her own past could not immediately be made into history. You had to sort of do something to it. So, you had to say something like "The peasants believed", but for them [the peasants], it was not a matter of belief. As Charles Taylor says in his book A Secular Age, when you live in a society where you have something like what he calls the 'porous self', a society in which you are not called upon to justify your belief in divine powers, a society in which the question "Do you believe in god?" is not a legitimate question, because god or divinity or divine power or bad powers exist everywhere around you and are part of your life, the existence of these powers does not depend on something called 'belief'.

Talal Asad wrote interestingly on the word 'belief', saying how belief itself is probably a Protestant category that eventually became a category of social thought. In a lot of Catholic practices, the question of belief doesn't arise. My friend David Lloyd, who got me to read Deleuze on Kafka² and introduced me to the whole idea of minor literature, told me a story (which I cite in *Provicializing Europe*)³ about a certain old lady who had been visited by the poet [W.B.] Yeats, when Yeats was collecting Irish fairy tales. As he [Yeats] was leaving he asked the old Irish lady: "Do you believe in fairies?" She said: "Of course not, Mr. Yeats, of course not." And then, when he had turned around to go out and leave the house, she said: "But they exist." So, the idea is that they exist and that their existence was not dependent on anything called 'belief', because the notion of belief may not make sense to the peasant.

¹ Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007).

² Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986).

³ Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2000).

In order to bring those voices into history, you had to engage in a particular operation of analytical thought. You had to say: "They believed and therefore they did that". It's this problem that made me think about why it was that the peasants' statement about the past was not necessarily the historian's statement. For instance, in African history, traditional tales will have places, like Indian stories do, for curses. You know, so-and-so became ill because so-and-so was cursed. Indians are full of such stories. Again, you have to do the same thing: state that they had a belief there was something called "curse". Then you could justify the belief. That's not the question. Thinking about it and reading Deleuze on Kafka and the idea of minor literature sent me through this circuitous route back to Kant's 1784 essay What is Enlightenment? In this essay Kant argues that Enlightenment is about the deployment of reason in public life. If history is a discourse of public life, the exercise of historical reason lies in the use of evidentiary procedures. And of course ghosts or bad powers or good powers cannot be proven to have existed through evidentiary procedures. So, in some ways, I thought of these kinds of pasts as 'subaltern pasts', i.e. pasts you have to subordinate to the past that historians, using the rational procedures of their discipline, reconstruct. The peasant's statement about the past almost occupies a position similar to the so-called native-informant position in anthropology, to which I then do something to make it into an understandable, acceptable story which can be debated on the basis of the very reasonable procedures of verifying evidence, weighing evidence and other such considerations. It is in addressing this question that I found a similar thing happened in Australia. Aboriginals have a song about Captain Cook in the northern territories. Now, everybody knows that Captain Cook never went to the northern territories. Still, Aboriginals were saying: "But that is my history." And then somebody justified it by saying: "But look at the structure of the song, it speaks to the experience of colonialism." And, of course, that general experience of colonialism cannot be proven by evidentiary sources. Evidentiary sources are usually about somebody's experience, and the historian's position would have to be: 'Oh, this is not the actual historical subject's experience or generalisation.

I'd like to make another point that goes back to a discussion I had in *Provincializing Europe*. In many ways, 20th century democracies came to people without the assumption that people had to prepare themselves for the rule of citizenship, like in John Stuart Mill's famous statement: "You can't have universal adult franchise without universal adult education." If you look at the 20th century, however, the history of democracies is precisely the undoing of this statement. So India gave everybody universal vote on the assumption that something called 'Indian civilization' had prepared people already for such a citizenly task even if they lacked in formal education. So, in a way, it's what [Eric] Hobsbawm once called 'the most revolutionary aspect of the 20th century', which is that tribal, peasant and all these people became part of modern societies and became citizens without having to go through the kind of personal transformation that Eugen Weber talks about in his book From Peasants to Frenchman. That's the distinction that I made between the 'waiting room of history', where you have to wait until you are ready for citizenship, and the whole anticolonial, anti-development emphasis on the now, the idea that you have always been ready for democracy. The situation was similar in Australia. The first time the Aboriginals were included in national censuses was in the mid-1960s. Before that, they were not counted except, sometimes, locally. A similar development took place in the US. The vote was extended as a result of the civil rights movement of the '60s. You can see that, suddenly, the past was a matter of disputation in many democracies: and this disputation was not simply about the past, it was also about different ways of talking about the past.

I just want to say very quickly that this whole question of disputation of the past has become increasingly important to me. The whole question of public history – how you actually talk about history in public and how you use different methods – has also assumed importance. And I just want to make two points based on two experiences from which I have learned a lot. The first one is from a trip to South Africa, two years after Apartheid was dismantled. There was a fascinating exhibition called *Miscast* which was organised by a group of academics at the

University of Western Cape including Ciraj Rassool and Patricia Hayes, and all these people did not yet have post-Apartheid textbooks to teach from. All the textbooks were from the Apartheid period and they didn't want to use them. Therefore, they created this exhibition which was actually about colonial anthropology and they had these resin casts of actual African people. The glass floor was completely covered with magnified prints of 19th century newspapers reports on colonial ethnographic expeditions. One side displayed all those tools with which you measure the breadth of somebody's nose, their skull size and all that sort of stuff. It was full of that. It was remarkable. Ciraj [Rassool] said to me: "Dipesh, I held this woman's pelvic cast from the 19th century and her pubic hair was still in it." There is a peculiar way of being in the presence of this woman which can never happen in written history. It happens in the archives: when historians go to the archives, they are actually in the presence of the past, but when it gets written down, this presence recedes. Then, Ciraj Rassool said to me: "Come in my car." He took me to a place that was a kind of a nowhere place, except there was a little strip of a road, which was cut off in the middle of a field. And he said: "Get out of the car." So I got out and stood on the road. And Ciraj said: "This is the road on which I grew up." I said: "What do you mean?" And he said: "I grew up in District Six" – the mixed neighbourhood which the Apartheid government wanted to make white. And the project wasn't finished, I think, but they have now created a museum, a wonderful District Six museum which is completely interactive. There's a map of District Six projected which is a completely imaginary conceptual map instead of being a projection of reality. If you have memories of the place, you can write them on the map, such as: "This is where the tea shop was, where we used to gather". And when I went in, people were still sending in their artefacts. It was an amazing experience of what you might call public history. People have written plays about District Six. The whole problem of District Six has been that the past has been performed in many different ways. That gave me one set of ideas about how to bring history into public life and how to put into contestation different forms of talking about the past.

The other experience I had that made me think about it again and which goes against historians' and also museums' principle of preservation of relics from the past, was more than a decade ago. At this time Australia's first republican movement argued for independence from the British crown. The republicans lost the referendum about this question, but I am sure it will come back. I was in the country and one day in Canberra when an artist, who was known there by the name of Greg Taylor, suddenly erected this statue of old couple, a man and a woman. Both their bodies were sagging, they were completely naked but for the fact they both wore crowns. The statues appeared by the side of Lake Burley Griffin in the middle of the city. The title of the sculpture was Liz and Phil by the Lake Side. Only the crowns told you who they were. One night the monarchists turned up and cut off their heads. So, next day people woke up and found out that the statues were missing their heads. It was an act of vandalism. The artist had actually taken the risk of putting his sculpture in a public place, knowing that it could be vandalised. He was not at all committed to the idea of preserving big art. In contrast with the nearby National Gallery of Art of Australia, where a Rodin sculpture it is accompanied by a sign which says very clearly "Do Not Touch", Taylor's statue was made to be touched and eventually destroyed. The destruction immediately made it into the evening news and post-news discussion. In this way, the whole republican point of view actually got a second airing through the destructive act of vandalism to which this artist was prepared to submit his work. It made me realize that an act of vandalism can contribute to the public debate as long as it is not an act of shutting down a discussion – which often happens in India with pro-Hindu vandalism of all kinds, including killing of dissidents. It ultimately made me realize that you cannot bring this contestation of history into public life if you're completely committed to the historian's principle of preserving every relic of the past. So, I actually thought that it could be interesting if democracies, on the condition that it must give rise to more

⁴ Down by the lake with Liz and Phil, by Gregory Taylor (1995)

debate instead of shutting it down, would have vandalism parks where you invite artists to submit their work to public disputation, including vandalism. Obviously it would be considered a case of failure if the vandalism was only meant to shut discussion down by threatening people.

I realize that these are not complete comments and I will not tie them up. I am simply throwing some ideas out to help our discussion. Thank you.

Nira Wickramasinghe (NW): Thank you very much. My comments are going to deal essentially with the idea of minor histories or minority histories. I will look at it in slightly different ways. Actually, I re-read your articles and it sort of pushed me in a different direction. It made me think of the whole idea of minor histories again. Now, I'd like to make two points regarding these tropes of minor histories or minority histories. The first deals with the issue of what we can do as historians beyond recognising the important task played out by minority histories or subaltern pasts, which is to show us the limits of historicising. The second point takes the notion of minority histories outside the frame of the nation. I would like to highlight new hierarchies of knowledge that have emerged between nation states in the global south, a condition that has spawned new forms of minority histories. Dipesh Chakrabarty mentions in his work democratically minded historians who have fought the exclusions and omissions of mainstream narratives of the nation by using the minor to cast doubt on the major. Now, I must admit that I am personally not engaged in an exercise in writing minor histories for the sake of retrieval or giving a voice to silenced people, and I tend to agree with someone like Marilyn Strathern, who advocates that, to quote her words, "We need to go precisely where we have already been, back to the immediate here and now, out of which we have created our present knowledge of the world."⁵

⁵ Cited in Ann Laura Stoler, Along the Archival Grain. Espistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Sens (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 32-33.

So, my modest intention is to intervene in the writing of major histories, creating a critical space where colonial, global and national histories are destabilised, reading anew the old tropes of power, resistance, nationalism, and also the newer ones of, for instance, governmentality. My own work on colonial Sri Lanka has been haunted by the need to explore political imaginaries outside given frameworks of religion, nation, state or empire, both in the colonial period and in the post-colonial period. I always felt that devoting separate chapters, as it were, for minority histories, and in so doing reconfirming the value of marginality, is less transformative than inserting these histories between the seams of the mainstream narrative. So, subalternity appears more as a contingent historical experience rather than bestowed with perennial and virtuous ontological status. I tried to do this in a modest way when I wrote a history of Sri Lanka called Sri Lanka in a Modern Age.⁶ In this book, I wrote a history of communities and of the political that, in many ways, subverted the mainstream narrative without explicitly stating my position, allowing minority histories, to use Hélène Cixous' term, to insinuate themselves in the text. I'm very pleased actually that this book is now adopted as the main text in most Sri Lankan departments that teach modern Sri Lankan history as well as in some universities that teach South Asian history with a Sri Lankan component without them actually realising that it is a kind of subversion of the mainstream. So, that's the first point I really wanted to make, which is really what we can do and what role minority histories can do, as either separate or inserted in mainstream histories. I think Dipesh Chakrabarty means that when he speaks about [Eric] Hobsbawm and various histories.

Now, to my second point. Within the academic history space – to borrow from [Pierre] Bourdieu – it is interesting to identify relations of force and historical domination by new actors that were once dominated, but now exert power over smaller entities. Now, I don't have time

⁶ Nira Wickramasinghe, Sri Lanka in the Modern Age: A History (2nd edition, New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).

to sketch in detail how this field of academic history operates, but I think someone should uncover its boundaries, its capitals, its highways and how certain historical provinces, or no-history zones, are created. Today I see with more and more clarity an emerging field where new hierarchies are taking shape in the academy and where the trope of the minor operates at two levels. It continues to operate in a hierarchical manner between European, western histories and histories of the south, but it also has currency within subfields of histories of the south. This state of affairs is partly due to geopolitics, with newly emerging states that aim for superpower status and are able to globally propagate types of representation of their nation that support this dream or delusion. It's also due to the restructuring of university teaching and research along cultural clusters – area specialisations – where larger states dominate the teaching curricula. Let me take an example I am familiar with, South Asian Studies. If I'm to ask who speaks today for South Asian pasts, rather than Indian pasts, I would answer: "definitely not any of the peripheral nation states of South Asia". History as a field of scholarship is most often appropriated by historians of India, where the smaller nation states – let's take Sri Lanka or Nepal – are anthropologized. The number of anthropologists of Sri Lanka, as compared to historians in international academia, and some of them very illustrious, whether it is [Gananath] Obeyesekere or [Stanley Jeyaraja] Tambiah, is quite telling. Smaller nation states like Bangladesh or Pakistan are also politicized and studied as theatres of current violent terrorist politics. But of course there are exceptions, and I must say I am one of them: an historian of Sri Lanka, professor of modern South Asian studies, and at my inaugural lecture I actually praised Leiden University for being revolutionary in many ways. But what I'm trying to describe is still really the norm. I'm just an exception, I think. This minor status is also visible in the publishing arena, where all these scholars working on India and perhaps on Pakistan are given the legitimacy to write in the name of the whole of South Asia. This is even accepted when they only deal with a very minute area of the subcontinent and their language skills are limited to one single region of India. They have the authority

to speak for the entire nation and region. So two things are happening. In the first place works relating to South Asia as a region are edited or written by scholars of India and, secondly, books referring to South Asia in its entirety in the title of the book make often no mention at all of any of the countries or societies of the periphery. They simply do not exist. So, 'minor' has taken a new meaning. And as a scholar whose initial work was on Sri Lanka I take note of these inequalities with some apprehension.

What then are the options for a scholar working on the periphery of South Asia? Based on observation of what is really happening in the field, there are two possible options. One is that she might transform herself into a global historian and many excellent historians of smaller states of South Asia are doing exactly that, not only at Leiden University, but also in places like Cambridge, where you have Sujit Sivasundaram, who is an excellent historian of early 19th century India, who has now become a global historian, or at Oxford, where Alan Strathern, who worked on the Portuguese period, also had to become a global historian. So, that's the first option, you go global. And to a certain extent, I am also doing that. In my work on Metallic Modern, I tried to cast a more multiscopic view on Sri Lanka and sort of extend the borders. And I published not in a South Asian studies collection, but in a broader series. The second option is really to move out of South Asia to a more welcoming space – and Indian Ocean studies has provided a refuge for historians of the periphery who, for instance, study Sri Lanka, the Andamans or Mauritius. Islands also play a significant conceptual role, constituting a kind of anti-continental geography that relativizes the territorial obsession of much nation state-focused history, but of course for Nepal it is much harder. So, as a domain, the Indian Ocean world offers rich possibilities for working beyond the templates of the nation state and beyond conventional area studies. It makes visible a range of lateral networks broadly falling within the global south or the global. In short, what I'm trying to put into words is that the notion of minority histories plays out differently in different fields and if we are to delve deeper into this question, we need to recognise and challenge the various and changing asymmetries that rule over the writing of history today.

Ksenia Robbe (KR): Thank you so much. It's a pleasure to be here and take part in this discussion. I don't know if I can speak with any authority about history, but I'll speak about historical issues from a perspective in literary studies and studies of representation. Dipesh Chakrabarty finished his lecture yesterday with some comments on what kind of strategies of representation we can use when we speak about 'planetarity' and attempts to decentre the human. I would like to think further through this question using examples with which I engaged recently in my studies of postcolonial, more specifically, South African writing and visual culture. You [Dipesh Chakrabarty] also mentioned the possibilities of the novel in terms of representation. I think all representation is ultimately about possibilities and limits, confronting the limits of representation. I would agree with what you were saying about the novel because the novel is about description and world-making: It is a mode of imagining a unity of time and space, thus creating a universe. At present, however, it is very difficult to think of such a unity and coherence – we rather think of the world as a disjuncture, and if we are talking about artistic representation, film and photography would be the means of representing the present, the disjuncture of temporalities. And if we are talking about literature, it would probably be poetry and non-fiction, due to their openness in capturing disparate times and their public character. If we are speaking about the possibilities of public history, poetry is a genre which addresses audiences – and I'm thinking particularly about African poetry as a public genre, not the way poetry has been practised in modern western cultures.

An example I was also thinking about – which speaks to the question of how we can access the subaltern – is a film that I saw recently. It's an Indian film titled *The Labour of Love*, by Aditya Vikram Sengupta. It came out recently and won a lot of awards. What is interesting about this film is that there is no speech, practically. It is speaking,

but it is speaking in those different languages which are not linguistic. That made me think about how to decentre the linguistically organised human using, as this film does, a subaltern minoritarian minor mode.

The film is a story about a couple living in Calcutta, both working at factories. She is working during the day; he is working during the night. They meet each day for only a couple of minutes, but they communicate through objects. The whole narrative of the film is focused on objects, or, more precisely, on surfaces. This metaphor of the surface is something, I think, that is useful for speaking about the minor and the subaltern. We can speak about the surface beyond which it is very difficult to move. It can give an impulse to our imagination, but it still remains a surface. It is a surface like a wall, for example, or textile surfaces, or water and bubbles in water. These surfaces can possibly provide a kind of language to think about planetarity through the minor.

Another example I was thinking of in connection to the minor and contemporary approaches to the minor is the works by a South African artist, William Kentridge. In his most recent project, *The Refusal of Time*, he sets out to think beyond Einstein's relativity of time-space together with a physicist. How can we go beyond the modernity of this theory? And again, as I mentioned in relation to the novel, does it make sense to break the unity of time and space? If so, how can we break it? The whole performance and installation is about disobedience in relation to time. It includes many different intersecting performances: there is film, dance, music and singing. The way these performances are interacting, while each of them enacts a certain narrative, goes against the modern conceptions of time. Therefore, I was thinking about it as another way of representing the minor in terms of its simultaneity and contemporaneity (with the major).

'Contemporaneity' is another concept I use in my research drawing on Dipesh Chakrabarty's work, particularly *Provincializing Europe* and *Habitations of Modernity*⁷. Thinking about the minor – which is

⁷ Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Habitations of Modernity* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2002).

habitually located mainly in the past and related to what within the discourse of modernity would be called 'irrational' – as contemporary, equal and simultaneously existing. Therefore, I was happy to hear you [Dipesh Chakrabarty] talk about the District Six Museum, because I think that's a very interesting example of enacting this contemporaneity and translating it for the younger generations. One of the media that the Museum uses is photography. Many walls in this house with two or three rooms are covered with photographs of people who lived in District Six who were forced to leave, while the floor in the hall is covered with a big map of the area as it was fifty years ago. So, how can the combination of photography and maps bring about structures of contemporaneity? What is interesting, since you were talking about vandalism and how vandalism can lead us to think about the public, is that next to the District Six Museum is this empty space which was planned to be a 'white' residential area, but because of the strong resistance movement during the Apartheid period no buildings were constructed there. It was left empty and it still is. So, this gap, this surface, is still there reminding us of this incredible imagination of Apartheid and at the same time about the power of the struggle against it. Next to this empty space is a district where many street artists, who have become well-known in Cape Town, live and use the opportunity to re-create city spaces. How these two sites – a silent and a vocal one - co-exist now side-by-side, in a disjunctive more, is very interesting.

Another point I wanted to talk about shortly is how we conceptualise these representations that seem to reflect 'minor' perspectives in terms of thinking about history of literature or history of art. If we compare developments in these fields to Dipesh Chakrabarty's summary of developments of history proper, we would find many similarities. This has been one of the significant problems in literary studies over the last twenty years or so: how do we conceptualise history of literature on local, global and planetary scales at the same time? What does using these scales mean? I would like to look at it from the local perspective of young South African writers who take positions in relation to the demands of going beyond the post-transitional, beyond the

postcolonial. These are mostly the demands of cosmopolitanism. So, we should write not just about local situations, but we should try to imagine links to other globalised spaces. This is exactly the problem of conceptualising 'global literature'. How can these young authors enter the market of world literature, which is at present open only for white writers, writing in English and writing what has been called 'born translated' texts⁸? What alerts me in this concept is the idea of 'already-translatedness' of texts (has it already been decided which issues are relevant for global audiences and which not?) rather than their being 'in-translation'.

What is interesting to me is the strategies of resistance used by young black artists who are confronted with these issues. And here in conceptualising history, I think one of the key notions, which I am taking from Dipesh Chakrabarty's work, is the notion of translation beyond a third universalising term. Translation is, in the words of Gayatri Spivak, a constant shuffling between two localised modes. And in this sense, writing by the new generation of South African intellectuals might be becoming cosmopolitan, but cosmopolitan in a vernacular, localised way. So, I think in this regard, the notion of the minor or the vernacular helps us think about not the global, which I would relate to 'world literature' in literary studies, but about the planetary.

I would like to end by asking a question. As we are thinking about the planetary today, and celebrating this mode, doesn't it mean that we are in a way returning to the minor? In the sense that thinking of the planetary – of our interconnectedness, not as peoples, as nations, but as individuals and people in the medical sense - might lead us to developing political modes of thinking as well, but primarily what we are dealing with are ethical questions, which posit the problem of the minor and its agency So, in order to think about the planetary, we need to return to the minor, or thinking about the planetary is actually thinking about the minor?

⁸ Rebecca L. Walkowitz, Born Translated, The Contemporary Novel in an Age of World Literature (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015).

Dipesh Chakrabarty: Yeah, that's really interesting. We will come back to that.

Wayne Modest: I must admit, initially I asked myself the question 'why would a person from a museum sit and talk about this kind of topic?' But then, Dipesh Chakrabarty brought up the museum and preservation, which gave me a modality for speaking.

I want to start off with 1907. There was a massive earthquake in Jamaica and that massive earthquake destroyed part of Kingston. There was a big court case in London about whether or not the fire started the earthquake, or the earthquake started the fire. Because, if the fire started the earthquake, it wasn't an act of god and therefore there could be claims. If the other way around, then there could not be claims. Marcus Garvey, at that moment, was upset at one of the white persons who went to the court in England to say that it was the earthquake that came first. There was also a spiritual leader, what we call 'revivalist' in Jamaica, who had actually imagined the earthquake before it happened, and nobody could tell him that that earthquake didn't happen, because he had felt it and he was on this square before it had happened, and he was preaching about the changes that would happen. So, in a way, I started to wonder why those histories of Marcus Garvey never get written. The other histories, the big ones, get written, but those small histories never get written. And the histories of that revivalist also never get written because he doesn't necessarily fulfil that fact-finding notion that we need. So, thinking about that, I just wondered whether or not – and this is my first question – there is a disciplinary possibility for thinking differently about what histories become important, or whose histories become important. Whether or not, for example, if you were to think of the anthropologist, would the anthropologist have asked such a question about the validity of the source of the spiritual or the religious. What is the disciplinary basis for how facts or specific things are immobilised or theorised? So, that is the first thing I want to throw out there.

I'm excited that you brought me into the 'museum sphere' just to think about the idea of past or present pasts. We need to talk more about that because one could suggest that all of the 375.000 objects in art collections are presenting the past. We are there in a kind of preservationist drive, to try to understand that past. One of the things that we tried to do recently in the museum - and here is where I am not theoretical but very practical - was to ask this question. We just set up a research centre, so thank you for introducing me as the head of the Tropenmuseum curatorial department, but that is what Google does, as we've been talking. Google has an afterlife that you can't get rid of. I'm actually the head of a research centre that we just started. One of the research centre's aims is to ask how we write particular other histories, whether minor histories or histories that are articulated as part of bigger history, but that have been ignored. How do we write a particular history of cultural representation, for example, that does not start from the moment the West found out about these cultural others? How do we write a history of globalisation that does not only connect South East Asia or wherever with the West, but that also envisions other regionalisms and other possibilities for writing those other histories? How do we write history in a museum which has always kind of disavowed history? So, we had this thing called 'histories of the present' or 'alternative histories' that we wanted to write because we wanted to ask the question, whether or not those histories are still necessary or urgent to be written.

There is one other thing that I wonder when we speak about minor histories. The difficulty I have when we have a discussion about it is that it always seems as if we must mobilise these histories to cast doubt on the western histories or the bigger histories and that it is only in the articulation between the two that they get their validity. And I wonder about that. It still seems to me that it is predicated on the idea that a bigger history is what gives validity or necessity to the minor histories and that troubles me. Therefore, I'm interested in trying to think about it from a very positioned space. One of the things we were talking about at lunch was the question of a museum person working in

Jamaica. One could call this working from a position of the periphery within the British colonial context. I always told people, when I was setting up a museum in Jamaica, that a part of my project was exactly fighting this big history and that I was constantly in a process of trying to recover a history that was never written. That's how I felt. I was interested in trying to understand what it would mean for the Caribbean to be a generative space, a space where histories can be written even if it is a space where there is a lot of loss because there is no archive. Then I come to Europe and I start asking myself the question - I'm political in that way - 'What is my project now? What work, what labour am I going to dedicate to this kind of museum? And is that the kind of work or labour that needs to be written as well?' That led me to this question about public history and the role of institutions like minor public histories. I like the starting point of the chapter from Provincializing Europe, which starts off talking about European multiculturalism and the crisis there. I can tell you that one of the issues that we've been thinking about is what role do museums play in this crisis and whether the contestation about who belongs is exactly about that question, of whose history is written, and how it is written, and how it becomes heritage and what power relations helped to write it into structures of heritage. I'm interested in those things from a perspective of the museum itself.

The last thing I was thinking about is this notion of the human. I wasn't at Dipesh Chakrabarty's lecture yesterday. I had some really human thing to do – a baby – but I heard a reference to it earlier to-day. It is something that I have been struggling with because I've been cautious about the moment or meaning of the post-human, the moment of the Anthropocene. I'm cautious there primarily because I am working from a Caribbean perspective, from a space that I think, for a long time, has not been allowed to be human. Therefore at the moment when we in Europe decide that we are going to move beyond the human, it is once again Europe that decides that it is time to move on to something else. For me it is quite interesting when Paul Gilroy uses the word 'planetary humanism'. He goes back to the notion of humanism

in a way that I think is still trying to claim its possibility, because it is always Europe that decides that it is time to move on because 'we've done it'. Can these minor histories do something else, so that we don't always move on so quickly?

There is one last point that I would like to make. I was hopeful, recently, when there was this thing that came up called 'world histories'. I say that because my museum is now the National Museum of World Cultures because we couldn't find any good names. It's hard to find a good name for these things, one that everybody agrees on. We've been criticised to death about this notion of 'world cultures' because people said that it is like 'world music', it just means other people out there. We tried to claim all of that. It caused me to go back to a question raised in a Johannes Fabian's book on world anthropology. Fabian writes a very interesting afterword in which he criticises it without even criticising it. That was quite nice. It is interesting that in his introduction he writes a lovely thing about how we're going to incorporate people from all over the world. At the same time, however, the seat of power where these histories are being written and where most journals are being published, is still the US. Even when the person who is publishing it is of a non-US background – he comes from one of the peripheries – he is still in a US university. So, in a way, the idea of how these locations still dominate what we do with minor histories or not is something that concerns me. I would like to think it through, because one of the things I have always said - and I lay myself bare here, I don't normally talk about the fact that I am black, but I lay myself bare - is that one of the interesting things that I have realised is how hegemony works. And one of the things about hegemony that I have come to understand recently is how even the notion of blackness that is written and understood today is American. So, where is it that we are in all of these minor/major, highly shifting relationships of power, when the position from which we do it is consistently where power has always resided, to be able to say that temporal moment of "can we move on now?" It is like the slavery question: people always say "get over it", but who decides that?

Audience (directed at DC): I wonder if the way that you were talking about the minor doesn't emphasise it too much. I am saying that because one of the things that the idea of Provincializing Europe inspired in my work is to start looking for the fragments inside the culture that pretends to provide all those big histories and large categories – the western history, so to speak. I'd like to give a very brief example that connects also to the discussion about what the media representation of these different public histories is. I've written a piece reflecting on what happens when you enter the south cloisters of University College London, where, already for a long time, the Auto Icon of Jeremy Bentham is being exhibited. The Auto Icon was the product of Bentham's will. When he died in 1832, he asked his personal physician to do a public lecture on his remains in which, as he put it, the animal part of his body was supposed to be elucidated in a public anatomy lesson. His identity - so his more human part, you would say - was supposed to be preserved by a form of taxidermy that set him up and that was supposed to maintain his identity forever afterwards. So, there's this stuffed Jeremy Bentham in the south cloisters that does something to people, regardless of whether they know that history or not. It made me reflect on material culture studies, in the sense that this thing will stop people in their tracks, even if they don't know that it is Jeremy Bentham. It is hard to miss because it says it in huge letters that it is him, but even people who do not know Jeremy Bentham will stop there and be sort of ambivalently attracted to this particular thing. I look at this as a moment in modern history - he is one of the most modern of philosophers in a way - that at the same time exemplifies a tentative possibility that never materialised later on. We don't stuff ourselves as a memento to the people that we leave behind, although Bentham did write a piece that argued that that should happen. In fact, he argued that it was preferable to burying people and having to pay all these taxes to churches and authorities. So, there are maybe also minor histories inside the western types of history that I feel provide possibilities that might change the landscape a little bit.

DC: I think you are right. Maybe the way I spoke about it gave that impression. I think that deep down, I was wrong. I like the way Ksenia Robbe was formulating it – the object from which you take analytical distance ends up being one from which you take temporal distance as well, whereas in the archive you are always in the presence of a relic. This act of 'being in the presence of' has been written about interestingly by Frank Ankersmit. However, it's actually by overcoming the feeling of "being in the presence of" of the past that you create this distance necessary for the writing of history. I think nothing is inherently minor. It really depends on what your method 'minoritizes'. Therefore, I liked her formulation: it is that which, in spite of your method, is seeking contemporaneity with you. What sort of comes back to demand contemporaneity is really what is minor, what gets 'minoritized'. So, the method is saying "I'm seeking distance, you happened then, I happen to be in the now" – and this distance underlines our sense progress, improvement, in a word, our development. So, by seeking contemporaneity, this element disrupts your story. The story about the woman's pelvic cast with her pubic hair in it for instance – it's what Ciraj said: "I was holding it in my hands. I was that close to her privacy, her body." It's that kind of 're-presencing' of the past and being in the presence of it that brings back the auratic power of the relic of the past. It is because it has an auratic power that it subverts the distancing strategy. Nothing is inherited.

I like the point that Ksenia Robbe was making. Earlier, I was talking to her about planetarity. I was telling about this young friend of mine, a German woman who is doing her PhD now in Paris. She just sent me her PhD proposal and I was very struck by the title. It said: "The Forgotten Earth". So, what she is saying is that even though Earth could be this huge object, in the way we have told the human story to ourselves - whether it's about rights, whether it's about roads, or going to Mars and colonising it, whatever - we have always abstracted this planet. So, the pilot has computer representation in front of him in order to navigate. The more we have abstracted this planet and produced these representations of it, either as a globe or on a computer

screen, however, the more we have forgotten the actual materiality of the planet - how it works, the interlinked geo-biological processes that constitute it. So, in a way we have 'minoritized' the planet. Then, the crisis of climate change or our planetary environment crisis is the planet claiming its contemporaneity with us. The crisis is basically putting us in the presence of the materiality of the planet. You could say we have forgotten our earthly condition. Bruno Latour made this interesting connection. He mentioned in a lecture in Virginia a couple of weeks ago that "the word 'human' is tied to the word 'humus' and tied thus to soil." He was saying that we have forgotten that we are earthly creatures and that the earthly processes affect us. In that sense, the entire story of human enterprise, however you think about it - India achieving ten percent growth, or China being the biggest economic power, the Americans being the most dominant - is based on many abstract representations of the planet, in physics, in geology and climate science. The more we have done that, the more we have forgotten the actual materiality of this planet and what sustains life.

So you could metaphorically describe the frequency of extreme weather events as the forgotten materiality of the planet that is now trying to come to the fore of our consciousness. It's trying to come to the foreground of our consciousness and, in that sense, it is a bit like claiming contemporaneity. It is claiming "I am here and you are in my presence". So, that which brings you to its presence, in spite of your methods, which are methods of forgetting, is really what would define 'minoritisation', both in the mode of making something minor and in the mode of it coming back to you. So, thank you for your formulation, it helped me. Maybe by talking about peasants in that particular instance, it might have looked like certain societies are 'minoritised'. I didn't mean to say that. I mean, it very much applies to Europe, there's no question. Henri Lefebvre, the situationist theoretician, has this beautiful essay called "One excursion to the French countryside on a Sunday afternoon" and it talks about his going back to the catholic

⁹ Henri Lefebvre, "Notes Written one Sunday in the French Countryside," in *Critique of Every-day Life: Introduction*, Henri Lefebvre (London, New York: Verso, 1991).

church that he grew up in and he talks about the way in which the niches in the church all call out to him and how the distance between his analytical Marxist head and his childhood experience almost collapses causing him to enter another time space. So, absolutely, there is nothing that it actually emphasises or should emphasise as a concept.

Audience: Hi, my name is Anne Gerristen, I teach here at LIAS-LU-CAS but most of the time I actually teach at the University of Warwick in England. I just wanted to comment on a couple of the things I have heard that struck me. First of all, I think that Wayne Modest's comment about who decides whether we move on and who decides which topic we are now all supposed to be working on really resonates, particularly in light of the point you were making about global history and the route to becoming global. This is something that's imposed on a lot of us and there has been this slipstream towards global history, as you were saying yesterday. And like it or not, somehow we all have to respond to that, in one way or another. At Warwick, I direct a global history centre. Your colleagues that you mentioned yesterday, Arnold and Abdul, before they moved on to the global history centre, clearly had followed that path, too. They came from a very different trajectory, a different kind of institutions, but at Warwick, then, global history became the place for them to do the kinds of things they wanted to do. In a way, that struck me because the decision about what language you use to discuss the problems that we face is hugely normative and restricted not just in regard to who decides what we study, but also in regard to what is the accepted language in which we can have those discussions and what's the discourse. In a way, that's always the problem I run into when I teach my undergraduates Provincializing Europe as part of a survey historiography course. I challenge them by saying: shouldn't we all be 'provincializing' Europe, and yet the language in which we do that, the style of the essays they write, the course in which that book is presented to them is all entirely structured by the western academic discourse of what history is. It is a course in historiography. So, the point I want to raise is the significance of languages and in a

way that is following on Sanjay Subrahmanyam's direction, too. The key to all this challenging and reading and accessing the wider archive has not just to do with the structures we use to access it intellectually, but also with the basic linguistic skills, which in England is a huge problem. Everyone started everything in English, there's nothing else.

DC: Sure, two points I want make here. One is that I totally agree with you on the question of acquisition of language skills, and there England has been a laggard. European or American universities' research faculties from the beginning insisted on language acquisition. In my university we actually teach eleven South Asian languages, which is probably the biggest number outside of South Asia and we insist on that. I think language learning is a very important part of humanistic scholarship. I grew up in the British tradition, both in India and Australia, and I regret it now in terms of not having learned more languages and not having been told to learn more languages. So, I'm totally with you on that question and it's good to hear somebody from England saying that. Going back to the bigger question, Wayne's question, which is partly Nira's question as well but in a different form. Now here's my take on it. I say it, and I mean it with respect: the question about whether you are being 'minoritised' by some structure is always a problem. Even within India, they always ask "Are the Bengalis talking too much?", "Are Bengalis taking up the available international space?". There's always this thing. So, this bit comes within India: who speaks for whom, even India? Now, here is my take on it and I learned this from Gandhi's life. Gandhi is a very interesting character. So, going by Ashis Nandy's argument, what does this guy do? He recognises from the beginning that the structure of hearing, being audible, being heard in the world, is already a structure of power. There's no automatic audibility. So, you have to work to find the method by which you will be heard. So, what does he do? First of all, he makes friends with completely marginal people in European cultures, so his friends are vegetarians and homosexuals and Christians who are actually marginal and who have some critical relationship to the empire. Then, he is also friendly, both in his reading and in his friendship, with American communitarians, who become transcendentalist. So, at one level, he's actually talking a lot to structures that are marginal but that are also western structures. Secondly, I think about his decision to come back to India when he's fifty. Given the lifespan of those days, he could have died at sixty. So, it was a late life decision and it is a decision partly made strategically with the knowledge that the colonial theatre, that the theatre of anti-colonialism, was going to amplify his voice. If Gandhi had stayed on in South Africa, he would have been a minor figure in world history because he was not linking up with the African black struggles. There are now books actually showing that he was quite problematic on that question. On the other hand, he knew that if he came back to India he would be able to play an important role in anti-colonial struggle as a whole. He's a great strategist, Gandhi. You have to give it to him, he's a genius. He amplified his voice a thousand fold by actually choosing the theatre. In a way, I think, there's no innocent speaking, there's no innocent hearing. You have to be strategic.

Here is now my second take on it. My first language is Bengali and I'm a deeply Bengali person in many ways – as deeply Bengali as they come – but I also describe myself as a very badly trained European intellectual, born and brought up in India. The traditions in which I had to learn to speak and think are not the Buddhist logic and the Jataka tradition. I read about them from time to time but those are not the traditions I have been brought up in. I've been brought up in squarely European traditions. So, I'm already within that structure. And that structure has decided who hears, who speaks, who talks. Before I wrote Provicializing Europe, I wrote the essay Who speaks for Indian pasts?. One thing that made me write it was that, at one point, I thought the academic conversation in the world is organised like a conference. There are many parallel sessions going on, and there are few plenary sessions. The plenaries are hogged by white people. We speak in the parallel sessions: twenty-minute presentation while the plenary person gets an hour. I thought we need to get into the plenaries but the condition of getting into the plenaries - and I say this

as a very deeply Bengali, deeply Indian history person - is that you have to find a problem that interests people across cultures. I believe that all cultures, intellectually, are equally interesting if you take the interest. Part of our problem, however, is that we are no longer historians of particular communities. There was a time when historians were historians of different reading communities. Therefore, there is a lot of vernacular writing in Indian languages of scholarship that is unknown in English. It is very good scholarship, but it's addressed to a particular community. Our home scholars might write for their own community. The flourishing of such scholarship was possible because globalisation hadn't happened yet. But when I was asking this question to myself an important change had already happened in the West: a Homi Bhabha was already speaking to a Stuart Hall! Stuart Hall found a place in the Birmingham cultural studies workshop, which itself happened because of post-war expansion of mass education and the English working class finding itself unrepresented in the history syllabus and other curricula. Where would you actually make room for studying pop culture, working class cultures, working class youth culture? Richard Hoggart's use of literacy is the foundational text for the Birmingham school of cultural studies. Then, Stuart Hall takes on this matter and then the London Municipal Council, which had a tradition of having left-wing people elected to it, gives money to the Institute of Contemporary Arts to bring Stuart Hall, Isaac Julien and Homi Bhabha together. They are thus enabled to organize a conference on Frantz Fanon. The postcolonials would later get criticised by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri for pushing a door that was already open. The state had already opened it. But you see, it was all happening within that sign-chain of the West. So, when you say the West decides, this West is now in its self-representation no longer the West of exclusively white domination. Our presence in the West owes something to those global changes. Those global changes may have begun in the '50s because of English search for cheap labour because of post-war demographical changes. When the West Indians, the Indians and the Pakistanis came, there were massive cultural changes in the West. That itself has changed the condition of hearing. If I had given this talk in the 1930s and said that "I'm a poorly trained European intellectual" I would have been laughed at.

On the other hand, to go back to the climate question, "who decides when to move on", and I totally agree with you when people say "Move on from a particular wound that I have given you," it is a problematic statement. This happens in India too. You know, two thousand Muslims were killed in 2002. Most of my business school friends are pro Mr. Narendra Modi, the prime minister. When we had a discussion on this, many said: "We have to move on." I said: "Hang on, you haven't lost your parents and brothers, so what you know of grief here? Who are you, belonging to the community that gave grief, to ask the grieving person to "move on"? And what does moving on mean for a person? My mother's dead now and I've moved on, but that doesn't mean I've forgotten her death and, if she had been killed, I wouldn't have forgotten the murderer. I'm with you on those questions, but there's the question of humanism and I totally buy the humanism point of Frantz Fanon or even Paul [Gilrov's planetary humanism]. But at the same time it's not a question of being a humanist. It's a question of thinking whether a point has come when we should also think about the limits of humanism. Now, who decides? That's a very interesting question. The entire climate problem would not have been possible to define after the war without American military investment in space research.

You gave me a very noble form of that question, "Who decides?" I got a very ugly version of it from Indian friends, who said: "Just when we start to consume? They said stop consuming." But it's not just that question. The question is, really, whether to even grant the validity of that question. One can live contradictorily. One can think contradictorily, and that's what W.E.B Du Bois talks about: double consciousness. He used his forked tongue. Try and really think: the science of climate change is actually not something that is trying to shore up western interests. The science is actually about enlightened self-interest. It's actually saying, even to western societies, that you can't go on playing this game of capitalism in this way because it is going to affect your own future generations. One of the best climate scientists, James Han-

sen, has a book called *Storms for my Grandchildren*. It doesn't say "storms for my Indian friends' grandchildren". So, in a way, the point is that while these scientists are not anti-capitalist scientists, they are clearly saying "capitalism, as business as usual, cannot go on". Now, saying that does not stop me from making humanist choices. Saying that does not stop me from talking about justice between humans. But talking about justice between humans does not stop me from talking about justice between humans and non-humans. If you give it a moment in which these questions are getting interrelated, then it just makes our job more complicated. We will have to do more things at the same time than we are used to. That's all I got to say.

Audience: I wanted to relate to the comment that Wayne Modest has made and which was actually a point of discussion with what Professor Chakrabarty was saying earlier about blackness and slavery and about getting over it. I often hear, also personally, that white people suggest that we just forget about race or that we just get over gender. This is interesting as I think Professor Chakrabarty said that it was exactly those who were not hurt that think it is possible to get this over with while it is those who have been hurt who have to find a way to move on. The point I was trying to make is really the other one, not this one. As Professor Chakrabarty has been saying, there is a shift, so, as Professor Chakrabarty was also mentioning, we all inherited western academia and function within western academia. Of course we also inherited the capitalistic mode. We function within this structure and we communicate in this one language which is the English language. So, there's also the question of to which degree we are conscious or critical about the degree to which we have inherited the modes and the norms and the rules of capitalism and western academia, about the degree to which we actually uphold, create, or re-create, or reproduce these norms, and about the degree to which we criticise them. The point that I was trying to make is: I think it is not about that, but it is more about the dominance and about the power and about the flow of power, because, as Professor Chakrabarty again is saying, the subject is shifting. It's

shifting away from white people, from western people, the intellectuals. At the same time the power is shifting and when the power is going from somewhere to somewhere it is thrown from somewhere. If we, for example, observe contemporary culture, movies such as *Snowpiercer* or Gran Torino, we see in those movies that the people who represent the future of the world are non-white people. In *Snowpiercer*, it is a Korean girl and a black boy, African-American or African. In Gran Torino, the one who inherits American culture is a non-white male boy from Hmong. The point that I'm trying to make is that, like Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri were saying in *Empire*, there is a new empire already in the making. In this new empire, the capitalists, the power holders, the ones who are dominating others are not exclusively white people, nor are they exclusively male. Of course we still have at least the idea of the white male who is dominating. He's still dominating, maybe he's ninety percent dominating, but there is a shift. What I'm trying to say is that, as Hardt and Negri say in their book, it is not exclusively white and it is not exclusively male, but that doesn't really matter in the sense that there is still the dominating and the dominated, and there still are the structures of power that shoot down responsibility, self-criticism and the ability to see these new structures that come into being. I think I was trying to say something about that, because when we inherit power, we inherit all the other things that come with this power. Maybe we did not inherit it yet. Maybe we have only inherited five percent but we are inheriting it more and more. I was just trying to say: to which degree are we really critical about that? I don't know, maybe I haven't expressed myself clearly.

WM: I think what I have to say is going to take a lot of discussion, because I'm actually just coming back to what you were saying, in a way, also about the planet. But similarly to you, if I may, it might be a bit rude, I always say to people that I inhabit a particular colonial condition and that particular colonial condition is British. It is similar. There is a particular way in which certain things become known and accepted, also in the education system. Just going back to your thought

about Gandhi and how you use that, it was interesting as well, for me, that we were talking about these networks where minority histories connect. Where minority stories connect and how 'minoritizing' can be a political project and part of a political imagination that connects different places. It is a political project that connects Stuart Hall with Homi Bhabha, as a part of another network of structures. We were also talking about what happened at the Bandung Conference and what networks it created to facilitate a certain kind of "writing back" in terms of the minority projects. For my last question, I would like to go back to your response to try to understand it. This is just troublesome, I'm sorry. I didn't understand your point because I thought your point was more or less to suggest that to think the planetary is not necessarily to think of the planet as a minority, but to think of the human as becoming part of the minority history in the bigger project that is the planetary concern. I thought that that was the point you were raising, which is a little different from what you were saying just now. I would like to ask about the materiality of the Earth, because I see the western imperialist project as having exactly that materiality. It is exactly in that materiality that we've been able to create the modern empires, whether or not it is through mining, through this, through that, whatever.

DC: There are two traditions of thinking about materialism and how we approach matter. One way to approach matter is how Marxists do it. Marxists say "you have to be materialistic and think of the logic of capital". You're actually being idealistic because the logic of capital is not matter. It's a concept. So, if you think the planet can be represented in a globe, if you think that the planet can be represented by certain numbers, you are thinking like a Marxist. You're thinking about the materiality of the planet, but by evacuating all matter from it, you are converting this matter into information that is manageable, that is extractable, and that is then represented. As opposed to that form of materialism, think of Martin Heidegger's wonderful essay on what is called

"the Thing", 10 where says something like this: "If you ask what this bottle is and you say it's plastic and this is its chemical composition, you have done in your mind what the atom bomb was meant to do to the world. You've actually smashed its materiality to smithereens." Then he talks about the pitcher. He says that the pitcher is what receives, contains and can pour out. So, he turns your mind back to the actual materiality of the object. The more we deal with this planet as just a collection of resources, map it for its prospect of mining and fossil fuels, the more we abstract it from its actual networked functioning. So, the planet we are forgetting is in the second mode of materiality, not in the first mode. You're totally right that capitalism deals with it in the first mode of approaching matter, which is by evacuating matter of all its immediate materiality and going and looking at matter through the chapter on chemistry elementary books called "Properties of matter", or René Descartes' definition of matter, which is res extensa. It occupies space. In thinking thus, you have forgotten the actual materiality, the networked materiality of this planet. That's what I meant.

KR: Let me respond very shortly. I was indeed thinking more about decentering the human with regard to the materiality, but more about how we can think about connections between humans and between humans and objects and nature in a different way. As you suggested yesterday, in your lecture, we should try and go back to indigenous knowledges and how we can rethink them as contemporary. So, basically I always try to draw, for example, on what research the comrades do. Also, in looking at indigenous knowledges of African people, for example, and showing how these are contemporary, not only for the community that they study, but for all of us. It's sort of how we can adopt them in our being and see human relationships and relationships between humans and objects, in terms of entanglement.

¹⁰ Martin Heidegger, "The Thing," in *Poetry, Language, Thought* (New York: Harper & Row, 1971).

EM: Okay, we are at about the full limit of time. I want to ask if the panellists have any brief final comments they would like to venture.

NW: I just wanted to respond to your comment about the plenary. I think it's still important to state that between these minority histories there are hierarchies – that not everybody is going to make it to the plenary. Some people would always remain in the, you know, the side lines.

DC: But there is a question of whether we inhabit now a condition where it's almost impossible to forget the dominant majority. Whereas those scholars inhabited spaces where they actually really didn't care about what somebody sitting in Cambridge thought of what they did. Maybe we need to retrieve those spaces because the dominant structure is not going to change.

EM: Okay, with that, I'd like to thank all the panellists.

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